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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OP UTAH 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, a New York 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HECTOR MARTINEZ and MANUEL M. 
RIVERA, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
vs. 
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS; 
STREATOR CHEVROLET COMPANY, 
INC.; AL BARRUTIA; BRENT H. 
JENSEN; and E.C. ROSEBOROUGH, 
Third-Party Defendants-
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, following 
decision and remand of Case No. 18072, by the Supreme Court, 
sought and obtained an amended judgment to allow plaintiff 
additional attorney's fees. Defendants-Appellants dispute the 
judgment entered by the lower court, as well as the amended 
judgment. 
Case No. SkOWZ? 
1-
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After notice and hearing, the lower court granted 
plaintiff's request for additional attorney's fees and entered an 
amended judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, GMAC, seeks an affirmation of the amended 
judgment and of the award of attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter comes before the Court a second time for 
review. A decision was rendered by the above-entitled Court, the 
Honorable Justice Dan I. Stewart writing the majority opinion in 
Case No. 18072, filed May 24, 1983. 
Initially the case arose as an attempt by General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation to recover an automobile financed to 
Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera. Subsequent to the filing 
of action by General Motors Acceptance Corporation to recover its 
collateral after default in payment, defendants-appellants joinec 
Great Equity Life Insurance Company alleging responsibility in 
that insurance company to pay the obligation based on a disabil-
ity claim of defendant Hector Martinez. At the conclusion of ai: 
evidence, the Court directed a verdict in favor of General Motor* 
Acceptance Corporation. R-188. However, the Court did not ente 
judgment pending the outcome of a decision to be rendered by the 
Court following the submission of a special verdict by the jury. 
See transcript of trial at page 525. 
After submission of arguments by counsel for defendants and 
Great Equity Lifef following the special verdict, the Court, on 
September 23, 1981, entered a judgment of no cause of action in 
favor of Great Equity Life and against defendants Hector Martinez 
and Manuel Rivera* On appeal in Case No. 18072, this Court 
reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case 
for entry of judgment against Great Equity and in favor of Hector 
Martinez and Manuel Rivera. 
To put the issues in proper perspective, counsel has com-
piled a review of circumstances arising after the trial• 
Following the entry of the judgment in favor of Great Equity 
and against defendant-appellants, on September 23, 1981, counsel 
for General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) filed a Motion 
for Entry of Judgment and scheduled the same for hearing on Octo-
ber 19, 1981. R-322. While the Motion for Entry of Judgment was 
pending and before the same was heard by the Court, counsel for 
appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on October 19, 1981. R-
326. The Notice of Appeal raised the question of the judgment 
entered by Judge Conder on his Judgment and Order of September 
23rd and the case in its entirety. R-327. 
For reasons not indicated in the record, but likely because 
of the unavailability of the judge on October 19, 1981, plain-
tiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment and for determination of 
attorney's fees was not heard. Counsel for plaintiff then filed 
the motion again on November 17, 1981, scheduling a hearing for 
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November 23, 1981. R-336-337. This hearing scheduled for Novem-
ber 23rd was subsequently continued to December 2, 1981 on the 
request of counsel for appellants, Mr. Mark Miner. R-338. At the 
same time of the notice of continuance an affidavit respecting 
attorney's fees was also filed. R-340. Mr. Miner filed a written 
response contesting the right of counsel to the fees, but did not 
challenge the amount claimed. See R-342-346. 
On December 2, 1981, the Motion for Entry of Judgment in 
favor of plaintiff was heard, but neither counsel for defendants 
nor Great Equity appeared. See recitation in Order at R-540. At 
the hearing on December 2, 1981, counsel submitted Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court, which were executed on 
that date, although not filed until February 5, 1982. However, 
copies of said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
mailed to counsel for defendants and Great Equity on December 2, 
1981. R-538. 
Also, on December 3, 1981, counsel sent a copy of the Order 
granting judgment (R-541), together with a memo of costs and a 
copy of the judgment by The Runner Service to respective counsel. 
R-539, 541 and 543. The originals thereof would have been sent 
to the Court. 
The Judgment and Order respecting the above action as it 
occurred on December 2, 1981, was not signed by Judge Conder, 
likely due to an oversight, until February 5, 1982. At this 
time, the judgment was entered by Judge Conder and signed "Nuc 
-4-
Pro Tunc". By way of explanation, counsel became aware that the 
particular documents sought in his designation of record filed 
with the Court on December 8# 1981 (R-534), had not been filed 
with the Court at the time counsel obtained the record for pur-
poses of preparing his brief in the first appeal. Thereafter, 
counsel contacted the Court to find that the documents were still 
on the Judge's desk. Whereupon, Judge Conder, in the presence of 
counsel, signed the same as December 4, 1981, but indicated "Nuc 
Pro Tunc* and designated his date of signature as 2/5/82* 
In the original action before the Court, counsel for appel-
lants argued the matter concerning the alleged liabilitly of 
Great Equity to appellants, but also raised in his brief and 
argument before the Supreme Court, defendants1 challenge to 
plaintiff's claim for attorneyfs fees. The decision of the 
Supreme Court did not speak on this issue. R-536-538. 
In its decision and by the remittitur submitted to the 
District Court, the Supreme Court determined "...the judgment of 
the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for entry of 
judgment against Great Equity and in favor of Hector Martinez and 
Manuel M. Rivera." R-534, 538. Rehearing was denied July 28, 
1983 (R-535) and the file was returned to the Salt Lake County 
Clerk's Office on August 5, 1983. R-534., 
On August 8, 1983, defendants' counsel filed his memo of 
costs (R-540) and on August 11th the third party defendant filed 
a Motion for Clarification of Judgment and scheduled a hearing 
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for August 19f 1983. R-544. On August 15, 1983, counsel for 
plaintiff filed an affidvait for additional attorney's fees 
(R-547), and further, petitioned the District Court to modify the 
judgment previously entered to allow added attorney's fees for 
time and expense incurred by plaintiff's counsel on appeal. 
R-549. Counsel for plaintiff scheduled the date of hearing as 
August 19, 1983, to correspond to the date of the previous notice 
indicated by counsel for Great Equity. R-549-550. On August 22, 
1983, defendants' counsel filed his own motion to modify judgment 
and set a hearing for September 22nd. R-551, 553. On August 
22nd, counsel for Great Equity also continued his previously 
filed motion to September 22nd. R-555-556. 
On August 25th plaintiff's counsel then filed a Notice of 
Continuance of its motion to modify judgment and for attorney's 
fees from August 19, 1983 to September 1st. This change was 
necessitated in that the Court did not schedule hearings for the 
19th as previously scheduled by counsel. See R-557. A copy of 
this Notice of Continuance to September 1st was forwarded to 
counsel for defendants on August 25, 1983. R-558. According to 
the Minute Entry of the Court (R-559), no one appeared for defen-
dants and the Court granted plaintiff's motion to amend judg-
ment. Plaintiff's order and judgment form were sent to counsel 
on September 6, 1983 (R-581), but the same were not signed by 
Judge Conder until after hearing was held thereon with respect 
to defendant's motion to strike the Order and Judgment filed 
-6-
September 12, 1983. R-560. Counsel for appellants further filed 
an affidavit requesting $3500 in attorney's fees (R-563), and 
asserted his efforts were worth $3500. R-569. 
Hearing was held before Judge Conder on all issues relating 
to the matters raised since the original appeal decision andf 
although respective counsel for plaintiff and defendant each 
submitted his respective Order of the proceedings (R-590 and R-
587 respectivelly), the Court entered a Minute Entry at R-579 
indicating as follows: 
After argument of counsel and a review of the memorandums 
and Supreme Court Opinion in the above case, this Court 
finds that the plaintiff's judgment against defendants 
Martinez and Rivera still stands. The Supreme Court only 
considered and reversed the issue on insurance coverage 
between the defendants and Great Equity Life Insurance. 
Since the motion for additional attorney's fees was 
presented by a motion before this Court on September 1, 
1983, and defendants' counsel failed to appear at said 
hearing, this Court will stand on its ruling at that time 
and grant the additional attorney's fee. 
On October 13, 1983, defendants' counsel appealed this 
decision to the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PRIOR DECISION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN CASE NO. 
18072, (A) DID NOT REVERSE THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE LOWER 
COURT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS MARTINEZ 
AND RIVERA, AND (B) THE SUPREME COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDIC-
TION TO REVERSE THE SAME. 
•7-
During trial of the instant action and following trial, the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder, entered two judgments* One was in 
favor of plaintiff under its contract. See Minute Entry R-188 
and Judgment R-539. The other judgment of no cause of action in 
favor of the third-party defendant Great Equity Life and against 
defendants was entered subsequent to the jury decision on Septem-
ber 23, 1981 • R-291. In its previous opinion, in Case No. 18072, 
this Court indicated, "The judgment of the trial court is revers-
ed and the case remanded for entry of judgment against Great 
Equity and in favor of Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera** 
R-538. At issue is whether the Court intended to reverse^the 
directed verdict and judgment of the lower court entered in favot 
of the plaintiff and whether this Court had jurisdiction in any 
event. Counsel submits that such decision did not, or if the 
Court so intended, that it was without jurisdiction to do so. 
A. First, in its decision, the Court at the outset of its 
opinion recognized that the trial court had entered judgment in 
favor of GMAC and against Martinez and Rivera and against 
Martinez and Rivera on their third-party complaint against Great 
Equity. However, the Court went on to say: 
The only issue on this appeal is whether a pre-existing 
illness clause in the insurance policy excluded Hector 
Martinez from coverage under the policy. R-536. 
The opinion of the Court then speaks directly to this issue 
and does not mention any consequence with respect to the judgmen 
entered in favor of plaintiff. The Court further, in its remitt 
itur and opinion, indicated the judgment of the trial court woul 
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be reversed and the case was to be remanded for entry of judgment 
against Great Equity and in favor of Hector Martinez and Manuel 
M. Rivera* Further, on review of the decision by Judge Conder, 
he also found after a review of the Supreme Court opinion "... 
that the plaintifffs judgment against defendants Martinez and 
Rivera still stands." R-579. Counsel would submit that the Court 
never intended to reverse the judgment granted by Judge Conder as 
decreed at the trial of the case (R-188), and as entered in the 
"Nuc Pro Tunc* judgment of December 4/1981* R-539. 
B. Secondly, counsel asserts that the Supreme Court, in the 
prior proceeding, was without jurisdiction to reverse the deci-
sion of Judge Conder, as that judgment was not properly before 
the Court* 
At trial, Judge Conder granted a directed verdict on behalf 
of plaintiff, but indicated that he would stay enforcement of the 
judgment pending the final outcome by the jury. See trial trans-
cript at page 525. Although the jury returned a verdict, there 
was some dispute between counsel for defendants and Great Equity 
Life as to the meaning thereof. This dispute was thereafter 
briefed by the parties and decision made on September 23, 1981. 
However, at the time the Court entered judgment in favor of Great 
Equity Life and against defendants, the judgment with respect to 
plaintiff's claim had not been finalized. Counsel for GMAC filed 
for a determination of the judgment on October 9th and scheduled 
the same for hearing on October 19, 1981. Although the motion 
-9_ 
was not heard on that particular date, counsel for defendants 
nevertheless filed his Notice of Appeal on October 19, 1981. 
R-326. 
Utah Rules of Procedure 54(b) provides: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court 
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more 
but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination by the court that there is no just 
reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry 
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or 
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties 
shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudi-
cating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all 
the parties. 
Under Rule 54(b), if there are matters which are unresolved, then 
any order that may have been entered is still subject to revision 
by the court before entry of judgment adjudicating all the 
claims. The appeal taken by defendants in the initial case 
(18072) was taken before a final adjudication was made between 
the rights of plaintiff and defendants. At the time of entry of 
the judgment relative to Great Equity and defendant on September 
23rd, the Court failed to make "...an express determination ... 
that there is no just reason for delay ... for an entry of judg-
ment." As a consequence, the appeal by Mr. Miner was premature 
and could not divest the District Court of jurisdiction to con-
clude the matter relating to plaintiff. Although Judge Conder 
had ruled orally from the bench that judgment should be rendered 
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POINT I I . 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE GRANTED ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR 
TIME AND riPPORT SPENT ON APPEAL. 
Counsel for defendants seeks here to reargue the question 
r a ised be f o c i( I 11 »j» 111 r I 1 1 1 11 | - i fji i|p i i J I J S [,I I. * • e t»11111" j J i 1.1) w n €* z n e r 
attorney's tees were properly awarded by Judge Conder in the 
ore/ious proceeding. Counsel submits that inasmuch as tn 
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was previously raised on appeal and no disposition thereof made, 
that reargument hereof is improper. However, if the Court deter-
mines that such should be considered by this appeal, then, in the 
interest of time and space, counsel has reproduced his response 
to that position in his brief previously submitted in Case No. 
18072. This is affixed as part of this brief as Appendix "A*. 
Based on counsel's argument in Point I of this brief, it is 
counsel's position that the judgment entered by Dean E. Conder 
either was not reversed by the Court, or that the Court was 
without jurisdiction to reverse the same in any event. However, 
at issue before the Court is the question of whether it would be 
proper for the District Court to have amended the Judgment to 
allow additional attorney's fees for efforts spent by plaintiff's 
counsel on the prior appeal. 
Although there is some authority to the contrary [Yamanishi 
v. Bleely and Coleshaw Inc., 105 Cal. Rep. 580, 29 Cal. App. 3rd* 
457 (1972); Vailes v. Marine Bosin Company, 224 NYS 2d 852 
(1962)] it has been recognized that a District Court has inherent 
authority in a proper case, if acting in a reasonable period of 
tim$ to amend its judgment to allow for an award of attorney's 
fees. See Lowell v. Institutional Investors Trust, 529 P.2d 92( 
(Ore. 1974) and Bratt v. Andrews, 514 P.2d 540 (Ore. 1973). In 
Bratt v. Andrews, supra, the trial court after entering a judg-
ment, later granted a modification of the judgment to allow an 
award for attorney's fees. On appeal, appellant argued that su 
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an award of attorney's fees, 
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Allow additional attorney's feeu *rhen petition thereof is i i !h" 
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within a reasonable time, should be adopted. The entry of judg-
ment for attorneyfs fees by Judge Conder in the court below was 
for services rendered by counsel up to the date of the proceeding 
before the Court. See R-340 and 539. Additional time and effort 
had to spent by plaintiff's counsel in protecting the interest of 
its client by the first appeal taken by defendants. Counsel also 
petitioned the court below within 10 days after the case was 
remanded to the District Court for the additional attorney's 
fees. R-534 and 549. Timewise this would be reasonable. To rule 
that the entry of judgment foreclosed any modification thereafter 
would compel either a loss to the plaintiff for services neces-
sarily rendered in protecting his client's interests after the 
date of judgment as a consequence of defendant's appeal, or bring 
about a separate action to establish the additional fees. 
Inasmuch as the judge sitting in the case would be in a 
better position to determine the reasonable value of the fees 
with respect to the case and opportunity for hearing thereon had 
been given to counsel for defendants, the decision of Judge 
Conder granting additional attorney's fees should be upheld. 
POINT III. 
THE ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT BY THE HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER 01 
NUC PRO TUNC WAS VALID. 
Counsel for defendants and appellants suggests that the 
judgment entered by Judge Conder as "nuc pro tunc* for December 
4, 1981, but actually signed on February 5, 1982, is void. A 
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r L 11111 i i i iik i• ijn j|>pi' i I • Utah S t a t e B u i l d i n g Board v . Walsh 
Plumbing C»Jmp.inj_r s u p r a . 
In t h e Wal 3h Pl'jjnb ing Company rM-*•* J M i i j lguit-nt n id 
been ^ u t e t e I on Apr i l \ 1 in l -vii a p p e l l a n t b rough t h i s a p p e a l on 
A p r i l ]0 r H h 4 r MIH c o u r t he ld t h a t t h e s ign ing of -in o r d e r o t 
judgment nuc [^f)J_njic t • I loin IMMI I I in I m n hu i nn^ a n r p -
t r i d L o r d e r was s i g n e d , cou ld not Dai the e i g h t of t h e a p p e l l a n t 
t o f i l e h i s appea l niLl im one month a f t e r t h e A p r i l m nil i i in 
- 1 5 -
In the instant case, the entry of the judgment by Judge 
Conder of "nuc pro tunc" was entered back to reflect a period at 
or near the date that Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
were signed and the matter in issue was argued before the Court. 
However, counsel's appeal opportunity would have run from the 5th 
day of February, 1982 and not from December 4, 1981* See Utah 
State Building Board v. Walsh Plumbing Company, supra. 
Counsel for appellants seems to suggest that the judgment 
entered by Judge Conder was void because it impaired his appeal 
rights. However, counsel has never taken any steps to appeal the 
judgment rendered by the Honorable Dean E. Conder on February 5, 
1982, except as he attempted to appeal the entire decision on 
October 19, 1981, before judgment had been entered for plaintiff. 
R-324; 539. As previously discussed in POINT I-B, this he could 
not do. See Rule 54(b) and Hinkins v. Santi, supra and Dixie 
State Growers Bank v. Washington County, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons as set forth in plaintiff's brief, the 
amended judgment of the lower court in favor of plaintiff and 
against defendants should be upheld and further, the attorney's 
fees as established to the satisfaction of the trial court shouL 
be awarded* 
Respectfully submitted. 
Jay V. Barney 
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CERTIFICATE ~ *\L\\W; 
I hereoy cerr :tv " ".a; „ _ r. *r; ana C-J-ICOL 4-;°F. • ^  "' 
foregoing 3nef :.: Plaintiff-Respondent was mailed, posi . , 
prepa ; i, *: *•: 
- S . M i n e r , E s q , 
. . , v rwr .ouse B a i i d i n q 
o 11 t Lake C i zy , C t an -> 4 
(Attorney £ t r Defendant 3-Apce 1 i ant 3 
Hector Mdf ; :-;< i : :i Manuel *•*, -Rivera) 
William J. Hansen, Esq. 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt La*e City, Utah 84101 
(Attorney for Third-Party Defendant - R e s po n :i e n t 
Great Sqrity Life Insurance Company) 
on this 12th day of December, 1936, 
i M y 7 Ramify 
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APPENDIX "A" 
POINT II 
WHETHER A PARTY TO A CONTRACT AUTHORIZING RECOVERY Of 
ATTORNEYS FEES WAIVES THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN SUCH FSES BY FAILING 
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THEREOF BEFORE THE JURY BUT THEREAFTER 
PRESENTS EVIDENCE TO THE COURT. 
Under our law, attorneys fees are awardable only if 
expressly providecj by contract or statute and then only if there 
is produced to the Court evidence of the necessity and 
reasonableness of the fee awarded. Walker v. Sandwick, 548 P.2d 
1273 (Utah 1976). There is no question that the sales contract 
in issue did provide for attorneys fees if an attorney was 
utilized to enforce collection of the contract. See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "1", reverse side, Paragraph 4. 
The establishment of a reasonable attorneys fee in a 
contested matter is not controlled by any set formula [Wallace 
v. Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 6*9 (1965)] and the 
same may be established by stipulation, an unrebutted affidavit 
or evidence given as to the value thereof. Freed Finance Compan\ 
v. Stoker Motor Company, 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975). Regardless 
of how the fee is proved, it is clear that the fee must be 
supported by evidence in the record. See Richards v. uodsori, 26 
Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971). 
Counsel for Defendants suggests two propositions as to why 
attorneys fees should not be granted: first, he indicates there 
is no evidence in the record, and second, that no evidence was 
presented to the jury. 
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iiiuiii in i mi mi mi mi I i I  mi in mi mi 11 i ipuui i i i HI i me r e c o r d e v i d e n c e s t h a t 
&i c t "me uOact d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t in t ivor UL H a i n t i t f , 
Counse l s o u g h t fo r u hoar i iv j t y e s t a b l i s h hLo «*] i m l u c 
a t t o r n e y s fi«i«», i i i i _. .LI - ni i m lament ijuii *<I upon t h e of 
C o u r t " i g r a n t i n g ot; P l a i n t i f f ' s mot ion tut d i r e c t e d v c r - h : : --
t r i a l , IR, i i»'i, Hi* m t i o n was m i t t n - "> ii 
23 i * '1H 1 i i ' II -n. ' l ieduied t o be nea i I uu ilecember *. , i l m , 
a t t o e r e q u e s t of Counse l Eor D e f e n d a n t s (l«> „ j t t e r 
r e c e i v i n g n o t i c e ol . Ii>« irMHibj and a uup / u l Cuuni&el's 
A f f i d a v i t Ifiv a t t o r n e y s t e i i s , n e i t h e r a t t e n d e d t h e h^arwivj nor 
Opposed t h e r LMitionableness of t h e f e e s in Lite \t f \ I n . 
( E . 54 U). Ci i < , ' » J .' " ',. ,. i,. »t. * on r ^ j u e s t i . H a d e n i a l of 
t h e a t t o r n e y s t e e s b e c a u s e of f a i l u r e LU p roduce e v i d e n c e o e t o r e 
tne ]ucy but ilia n >i c n a l l e n q e t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s Ilhl,j ! . '*•;. 
I n ' „ " I !i 'i „ "\ i i i - i e * ) i r i i i i I • in p r o p e r l y jw;uued d c t o n i u / j t e e s 
a t t e r t h e t r i a l based u, p r o p e r
 t e v i d e n c e , JII 1 in u n r e b u c t e d 
a f f i d a v i t . (R, 5 "16-SIN- k . S3 I I1 iMh< Freud v" n u n c e C<:>ni;jari y v , 
S to l le r , MO t o e Luropdiiy, s u p r a . 
The second q u e s t i o n f i l l e d iA whe ther f a i l u r e if Counsel 
t o p r o v i d e t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e t h e lury f i r i i , r n i Lfh'i .u 11 m 
",r"i'l "dps • i i" J iii.-; t juen t e n t t / *L L l * *; IAMI J, t. \J t r JO r :c 
a t t o r n e y s f e e s must be proved as otm*r i n i i j e s , tn . i t ij, , / 
s t i p u l a t i o n or e v i d e n c e , h ' l ' i ^ v J i l > r« ' ,jtj '• - I l j , i I i h 
1 9 7 ^: " ' * h ir;:". -i i i f r. ) rth-jiii iiu*-L ne r e j o o n a o l e n o s s u£ 
lim mi, ie« ye pi > i • l Thi a Cour t has 1 i>n*j h>. I 1 th . i t t:l |. I , 
ha* !t'i§ power t j de tdr ra i im «ti ii I u J ,. ,-iijoie u t t o u w y y tuy 
tfhe.i a c l a im i*lh r » r * 1
 ( f i p e r l ^ n i ^ sue oy c o n t r a c t or by 
rftdtui i- mi M i s t r i a l Commiss ion, 115 Utah -irifi i 7 
P«2d 178 (1949) • Further, as stated in Wallace v. Build, inc>i 
402 P.2d 699, 701, (1965): 
What is reasonable depends upon a number of 
factors, the amount in controversy, the extent 
of services rendered and other factors which 
the trial court is in an advantaged position 
to judge. Emphasis added. 
I n
 F-»M»A* Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc^, 17 Utah 
2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965), the Court recognized that an 
award of attorneys fees need be supported by some evidence 
to the judge, stating at page 673 of 404 P.2d: 
Because both judges and lawyers have special 
knowledge as to the value of legal services, 
this (proof of fees) is not always required 
to be proved by sworn testimony. It is 
sometimes submitted upon stipulation as to 
the amount? or that the judge may fix it 
on the basis of his own knowledge and 
experience; and/or in connection with refer-
ence to a bar approved schedule. Emphasis 
added; matter in parenthesis and underlining 
by author* 
Prom the authorities cited, it is evident that the 
reasonableness of an attorneys fee is a matter for court 
determination. The reasonableness of this position affords the 
trial judge, hinfself an experienced lawyer, the opportunity of 
determining what is reasonable in a given case. Laymen jurors 
unfamiliar with the demands and efforts of counsel, would not 
be in a position to identify what is reasonable in a given cas 
Producing such evidence would be a waste of the jurors1 time. 
Further, if evidence concerning reasonableness of attorneys fe 
is produced before the jury, this puts counsel in the awkward 
situation not only of having to argue the cause of his client 
its merits but to justify before the jury his charges for his 
services, thus requiring counsel to, "have a fopl for a clien 
A reading of the case of Gardner v. Christiansen, 622*P 
782 (Utah 1980), might cause one to conclude that an award of 
attorneys fees must be based upon evidence produced in the C£ 
in chief and not after. Here, Counsel, after resting his case 
and prior to closing argument, moved to reopen, in a hearing 
before the judge, to produce evidence of attorneys fees, which 
was denied by the Court. On appeal, the Court although 
recognizing that a motion to reopen for additional evidence is 
within the sound discretion of the Court, nevertheless ruled the 
trial Court abused its discretion in failing to allow counsel to 
present the requested evidence. The case does not stand for the 
position that evidence of attorney's fees must be made prior to 
resting one's case. In fact, in Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 
28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972), the Supreme Court remanded 
the case to the District Court for the purpose of taking 
evidence on the issue of attorney's fees, when such evidence was 
omitted at trial. 
Even assuming that the jury was the proper forum to have 
heard the evidence relative to attorneys fees, failure of 
counsel to present evidence to the jury would not be fatal to 
the award rendered by the Court in the instant case. Then, the 
Court directed a verdict for Plaintiff at the close of all the 
evidence, the Court took all issues relating to Plaintiff's case 
from the jury. Therefore, it also had the discretion to receive 
such further evidence in the case as it deemed pertinent. See 
Gardner v» Christiansen, supra. 
In the exercise of its discretion* the lower Court granted 
Counsel for Plaintiff, after notice to Defendants' Counsel, an 
opportunity to present its claim for attorneys fees and accepted 
the affidavit as presented* Such discretion in proceeding was 
not prejudicial to the rights of Defendant (See Gardner v« 
Christiansen, supra at 784), especially where the affidavit of 
Plaintiff's Counsel as to the reasonableness of the fees was 
unopposed* See Freed Finance ^ Company v» Stoker Motor Company, 
supra. 
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower 
Court awarding attorneys fees should be upheld. 
